From the Cabinet Room to the Frontline: Thai Politics on the Brink

Despite the "Red Bloc," led by the de facto leader Thaksin Shinawatra, holding sway over the executive branch, its rival—the "Blue Bloc" with power broker Newin Chidchob operating behind the scenes—maintains a firm grip on the Senate through the Blue Party and Blue-aligned senators. There’s no sign that they intend to back down anytime soon.

Complicating matters further are shadowy forces seeking a share of power, which could make it difficult for this "coalition government" to survive its full term, despite ongoing efforts to maintain stability.

Krungthep Turakij outlines the critical political flashpoints of June 2025, highlighting the growing rifts within the coalition government as it faces a series of high-stakes challenges.

June 4–10: Cabinet Reshuffle Talks

The central issue: the Ministry of Interior. Thaksin and his Red Bloc allies are pushing to reclaim it from Anutin Charnvirakul, leader of the Bhumjaithai Party.

While Thaksin has publicly cited ineffective coordination as the reason, arguing that the government’s policies aren’t being properly executed at the local level, many believe the real motive is to dismantle the entrenched Blue Bloc power network that’s steadily expanding its influence across local political structures.

The Interior Ministry controls the local administrative apparatus and key provincial positions, which are crucial to policy implementation—and even more crucial to electoral outcomes.

If the Blue Bloc is allowed to consolidate its grip at the local level, Bhumjaithai could gain a decisive advantage in the 2027 general election. With Newin—the “Headmaster”—strategically orchestrating long-term plans, success is rarely left to chance.

Meanwhile, Internal Tensions Brew Within the United Thai Nation Party (UTN)

The UTN has also become part of the Cabinet reshuffle equation. Deputy Commerce Minister and UTN deputy leader Suchart Chomklin recently stirred the pot by publicly dining with several party MPs—seen as a move to rally those discontented with the leadership of party head Pirapan Salirathavibhaga, who currently serves as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Energy.

Although Suchart is widely known to have powerful backers, Pirapan is vulnerable at this moment, creating an opening for behind-the-scenes figures to manoeuvre for his removal. The aim: to trigger a Cabinet shake-up within the UTN quota.

Rumours are swirling that Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra plans to wrap up the reshuffle quickly in a bid to shore up public confidence in her administration, though doing so may deepen existing cracks within the ruling coalition.

June 12: Medical Council Convenes Over Thaksin’s 14th Floor Stay

The Medical Council is scheduled to revisit the controversial case of former Prime Minister Thaksin’s prolonged hospital stay on the 14th floor of the Police General Hospital. Previously, the Council had ruled to discipline three doctors involved: one received a formal warning for substandard medical practice, while two others had their medical licenses temporarily suspended for providing inaccurate medical documentation.

The Council’s decision was submitted for final consideration to the “Special President of the Council,” a position currently held by Public Health Minister Somsak Thepsuthin, under Section 25 of the Medical Profession Act (1982). In a rare move, Somsak vetoed the Council’s ruling.

He reasoned that the Council had failed to consider the legal procedures for inmate transfers under the Department of Corrections Act, which places the decision-making authority solely in the hands of the prison warden. As such, he argued that the benefit of the doubt should be given to the accused doctors.

On June 12, the Council will vote on whether to override Somsak’s veto. This will require a two-thirds majority from the 70-member board, unlike the previous decision, which passed by a simple majority.

June 13: Supreme Court to Hold Hearing on Thaksin’s Prison Hospitalisation

The Criminal Division of the Supreme Court for Holders of Political Positions has scheduled a formal hearing regarding the Department of Corrections’ decision to transfer Thaksin, who was originally sentenced to 8 years in prison, later reduced to one year, to the Police General Hospital instead of serving time in Bangkok Remand Prison.

Key figures summoned to testify include the Bangkok Remand Prison warden, the Director-General of the Department of Corrections, and the Chief Medical Officer of the Police Hospital. All have been instructed to provide written statements and appear in person before the court.

This court hearing has reportedly rattled Thaksin, as it follows a wave of attacks from conservative hardliners and Blue Bloc allies, who see his hospital stay as preferential treatment and a symbol of elite impunity. The mounting legal pressure has fueled speculation that Thaksin may be considering fleeing the country once again.

June 14: Thai-Cambodian JBC Talks Amid Tensions Over Border Dispute

The Joint Boundary Committee (JBC) meeting between Thailand and Cambodia, scheduled to take place in Phnom Penh, stems from a rising conflict in the Chong Bok area—a hotspot of territorial dispute where both sides claim overlapping land.

While both governments have expressed a desire to resolve the issue diplomatically, behind the scenes, Cambodian leaders—Prime Minister Hun Manet and Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister General Tea Seiha—have reportedly reached out directly to Thai government figures, requesting that border crossings not be closed just yet.

Domestically, many Thais have grown uneasy over what they see as the Thai government’s overly conciliatory stance. This is in stark contrast to the assertive tone from the Cambodian side, which has not only threatened to take the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) but has also publicly warned that military force may be used in the event of perceived encroachment.

Cambodia has clearly adopted a fast, hard-line approach, with senior figures like Hun Sen—now President of the Cambodian Senate—and his son Hun Manet signalling a readiness to escalate.

The Paetongtarn administration, however, has been perceived as soft-spoken and reluctant to respond with equal force. That said, the Thai military appears to have adopted a much more assertive posture, unwilling to concede ground. All eyes are now on the outcome of the JBC talks, as the stakes involve both national sovereignty and domestic political fallout.

June 15: Senate Collusion Scandal Escalates

On this date, the 26th investigative panel—comprising representatives from the Election Commission (EC) and the Department of Special Investigation (DSI)—has already issued five rounds of summons, calling in 127 individuals, mostly linked to the Blue Bloc’s Senate network.

Confidential DSI data reportedly indicates that as many as 150 individuals could be implicated, with a sixth round of summons expected. It may include several high-profile figures deeply embedded within the Blue Bloc.

This legal offensive, seen as a strategic move by the Red Bloc, is an attempt to halt the Blue Bloc's creeping influence across independent agencies. Should the Blue network, orchestrated by the so-called “Headmaster,” succeed in embedding loyalists across state institutions, it could pose an existential threat to Thaksin and the ruling Pheu Thai Party, long-standing political rivals of the Blue faction.

Conclusion: June’s Boiling Point in Thai Politics

June is shaping up to be a month of political heat reaching boiling point—with critical implications for the stability of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s administration and the broader fortunes of the Shinawatra family in Thailand’s ever-volatile political theatre.